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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The paper advances an answer to a puzzle: Why is any lending or borrowing done in 
terms of money, when such money debt exposes the lenders’ wealth to inflation risk? The 
‘received’ answer to this question is that money bonds are just proxies for real bonds, 
proxies born of insufficient appreciation, or a benign neglect, of inflation risk. As mere 
‘proxies’, this answer implies that money bonds are redundant: anything a money bond 
could do, a real bond could do. The thesis of the paper is that money bonds are not 
redundant. Money bonds have a social benefit. That benefit lies in the reduction that 
money bonds secure in the unpredictability of consumption that arises from the operation 
of real balance effects in an environment of unpredictable money shocks. It is the very 
vulnerability of money bonds to inflation makes them useful in immunising the economy 
against unpredictable redistributions of purchasing power caused by real balance effects. 
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This paper is concerned with the question: ‘Why is any lending or borrowing done in 
terms of money, when such money debt exposes the lenders’ wealth to inflation 
risk?’. The ‘received’ answer to this question might go as follows:  
 
 All money bonds are ‘really’ real bonds; they just take the form of money 
 bonds.  In fact, all money incomes and outlays are ‘really’ real, but are merely 
 expressed in the form of money. An offer of a wage income, for example, is an 
 offer of a real wage, but will be expressed in the form of an offer of a 
 money  wage. Similarly, a loan of a certain amount real resources is 
 expressed in the form of a loan of money.1 Wages or loans are in the form of 
 money on account of the convenience of using the medium of exchange – 
 money- as the unit of account, rather than (say) the consumer price index. The 
 pursuit of this convenience does create the chance of some unanticipated 
 inflation changing the real value of a debt, but that chance is neglected, or 
 negligible. 
 
The conclusion of this logic is that money bonds are just proxies for real bonds, 
proxies born of insufficient appreciation, or a benign neglect, of inflation risk. The 
implication is that money bonds are redundant. Money bonds are without social 
function. Everything could be done and done better with inflation indexed bonds. 
 
                                                 
1  ‘If you lent me so much labour and so many commodities; by receiving five per 
cent you always receive proportionate labour and commodities, however represented, 
whether by yellow or white coin, whether by pound or by ounce’. 
 
David Hume, Of Interest, 1754. 
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The thesis of this paper (drawn from Coleman 2007, pp138-159) is that money bonds 
are not redundant. Money bonds do have a social function. If money bonds did not 
exist, it would be necessary to invent them. Or, it would, at least, be advantageous to 
invent them. The advantage of money bonds lies in the reduction they secure in the 
unpredictability of consumption that arises from the operation of real balance effects 
in an environment of unpredictable money shocks. It is the very vulnerability of 
money bonds to inflation makes them useful in immunising the economy against 
unpredictable redistributions of purchasing power caused by real balance effects. For 
it is the very dependence of the real value of money debt to the price level that allows 
money bonds to operate as a counter-weight to the dependence of the real value of 
money balances to price level. It is a case of taking a non-neutrality to beat a non-
neutrality. 
 
The upshot of the analysis is that, rather than money bonds being born of a negligence 
of inflation risk, it is the very consciousness of inflation risk that will create a demand 
and a supply of money bonds. 
 
The argument is based on the analysis of a standard Ramsey-Solow macro model, 
with the usual suite of assumptions. 
 
The paper proceeds by first demonstrating that money debt is functionless in such a 
model without monetary risk, and then showing the functionality of money debt in 
such models with money risk. 
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The model 
Consider the familiar Ramsey-Solow with the standard array of assumptions: identical 
homothetic preferences, exogenous labour supply, two-factor constant returns to scale  
production function, perfectly competitive factor and product markets, general 
equilibrium …  In the absence of risk, the model’s foundations may be characterised by 
this suite of equations, 
 
 ...
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When money debt is redundant debt 
Let the standard Ramsey-Solow model be augmented by inserting real money into the 
utility function, and supposing the supply of nominal money is given. Then price level 
will be determined, Quantity Theory style, by an equality between the demand and 
supply of money. 
 
In such a monetary economy there may be said to be two types of risk: the risk of a 
shock to technology (that will impact on the rate of profit), and the risk of a shock to 
money supplies (that will impact on the value of money). The presence or absence of 
these two types of risk creates a matrix of four possibilities:  
 
 Both technological and monetary risk absent;  
 Technological risk present, but monetary risk absent;  
 Monetary risk present, but technological risk absent;  
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 Both technological and monetary risk present. 
 
This section demonstrates that money bonds are redundant in the first two types of 
economy: economies without monetary risk. 
  
Both technological and monetary risk absent;  
 
If both technological or monetary risk are absent then the optimisation conditions are, 
 
   1[1 ]Uc Ucρ= +   capital    
 
1[1 ]Uc r Uc= +    real bonds   
 
1
1
1
iUc Ucπ
+= +    money bonds   
 
 
Inspection indicates that the equimarginal conditions for both real bonds and money 
bonds are redundant. They simply ‘repeat’ the relation between current and future 
marginal utility that capital secures. The markets for real and money bonds do not do 
anything that the capital market does not do. 
 
Technological risk present, but monetary risk absent  
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Suppose now that the future path of the price level is known, but the profit rate is 
risky. The optimisation conditions are now, 
    
 
   1[ [1 ]]Uc E Uc ρ= +   capital    
1[1 ]Uc r EUc= +   real bonds   
1
1
1
iUc EUcπ
+= +   money bonds   
 
    
Inspection reveals that real bonds now do not merely repeat the relation between 
future and current marginal utility secured by capital. This is significant, and is a sign 
of the functionality that real bonds now possess. In an economy characterised by 
technological risk the conditions for capital and real bonds will secure - in fairly wide 
circumstances - the socially efficient sharing of risk borne of technology shocks. 
More specifically, the conjunction of markets for capital and real bonds will secure 
the welfare efficient ‘synchronisation’ of the consumption of all interests in the face 
of these shocks; the consumption of all interests rise and fall in tandem with the social 
supply of consumption.  
 
This proposition may be easily illustrated using a special case.  
 
The Two Group: Two State: Two Period Model 
 
Suppose there are just two periods; Period 0 and Period 1.  
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Suppose also there are just two possible states of the world in Period 1: State 0 and 
State 1. State 1 is the high output state of the world. State 0 is the low output state of 
the world. We also assume, for the time being, that the high output state of the world 
is also the high profit rate state of the world, and the low output state of the world is 
also the lower profit rate state of the world. (This assumption can be relaxed).The 
probability of State 0 is p. 
 
We additionally suppose that there are two groups or ‘classes’ that make up the 
population, F and G. The two groups are completely homogeneous in composition, 
but differ from each other in their relative factor endowments. Group F has a 
relatively high amount of capital, and group G has a low amount of capital. The two 
groups have identical preferences. 
 
Finally, we suppose, for the moment, that saving of the two groups in period 0 is 
exogenous. Consequently, the magnitude of the stock of capital in period 1 is 
exogenous. Further, total saving in period 1 simply equals the negative of the capital 
stock, as there is no wish to have capital in period 2. Thus the consumption 
endowment of each group in period 1 equals their income from the factors they own, 
plus their endowment of capital.  
 
The consumption endowment can be represented in an Edgeworth Box Diagram. 
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Figure 1: Social and private endowments in a two state model of risk 
0
1
FC = consumption of F in state of the world 1 in period 1 etc 
 
E 
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As F and G are expected utility maximisers, it helps to plot on the Box the ‘expected 
utility indifference curves’ of F and G. The expected utility curves of F have a slope 
of p/[1-p] at the 45 degree ray from the south-west origin.2  
 
It also proves helpful to plot on the Box ‘iso expected consumption’ loci, each locus 
indicating the combinations of State 1 consumption and State 0 consumption which 
yield a certain level of expected consumption. These ‘iso expected consumption’ have 
a slope of p/[1-p ].3 Thus the expected utility indifference curves and ‘iso expected 
consumption curves’ are tangential at the 45 degree line. 
                                                 
2 Given 0 11 1( ) [1 ] ( )
F F FEU pU C p U C= + −  then 0 0 11 1' [1 ] 'F F FdEU p U d C p U dC= + − . As 
0 1' 'U U= along the 45 degree ray, if 0FdEU =  along the 45 degree ray then 
0
1 1
[1 ]F Fpd C dC
p
−= − . 
3 Given 0 11 1 1[1 ]
F F FEC p C p C= + −  then 0 11 1 1[1 ]F F FdEC pd C p d C= + − .If 1 0FdEC =  
then 0 11 1
[1 ]F Fpd C d C
p
−= − . 
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Figure 2: Preferences and expected consumption in a two state model of risk 
 
G’s expected utility indifference curves can also be plotted on the Edgeworth box. 
The expected utility curves of G have a slope of p/[1-p] at the 45 degree ray from the 
north-east origin. 
 
Plainly, most distributions of consumption between the F and G are pareto inefficient. 
 
Iso-expected 
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Figure 3: Most consumption points are pareto inefficient 
 
But it is also plain that there exist efficient distributions, that are located at the 
tangency of the indifference curves of F and G.  
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Figure 4: The locus of efficient distributions in consumption 
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Under our assumptions these efficient distributions lie upon the diagonal of the Box.  
Thus, under identical and homothetic preferences, efficient management of social risk 
entails that if society’s consumption is x percent higher in the favourable state 
compared to the unfavourable state, then every individual’s consumption is x percent 
higher in the favourable state compared to the unfavourable state. All boats must rise 
 
Diagonal 
 = 
locus of 
efficient 
consumption 
1CF1 
0CF1 
0CG1 
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45 degrees 
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and fall with the tide, equally. That is the welfare efficient way of dealing with risk 
under identical and homothetic preferences. 
 
But what is the relation between the efficient allocation of consumption and the 
market allocation of consumption?  
 
The analysis implies that the market for real bonds will, with some exceptions noted 
below, secure this welfare efficient allocation. The critical observation to sustain this 
contention is that F can shift their consumption point from their endowment point by 
selling bonds in period 0 in order to buy capital in period 0. If bonds are not to 
dominate capital, or visa versa, it must be that 1ρ > r > 0ρ. This implies that F’s 
purchase of bonds, financed by the sale of equal value of capital, will reduce F’s 
consumption by 1ρ−r in state of the world 1, and increase F’s by r-0ρ in state of the 
world zero. In other words, F’s consumption point is sent ‘south east’ by F’s purchase 
of bonds. Greater purchases of bonds by F will send F’s consumption further ‘south-
east’ along a line with a slope in absolute terms of
1
0
r
r
ρ
ρ
−
−   
 
Conversely, F’s purchase of capital, financed by the sale of bonds, will shift the F’s 
consumption point ‘north west’. 
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Figure.5: The consumption point is shifted by the exchange of bonds and capital  
 
 
In the same way, G can shift themselves along the same frontier by either buying 
capital and selling bonds, or, selling capital and buying bonds. 
 
The Box Diagram shows the general equilibrium, where F wants to buy the same 
number of bonds that G wants to sell. 
 
E 
F Selling K, 
F Buying B 
F  Buying K, 
F Selling B 
0CF1 
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Figure 6: Equilibrium 
 
Evidently, F and G at the equilibrium point are on a higher level of expected utility 
than at the autarkic point E. There are social gains from trading bonds for capital. 
Essentially, those burdened with risk have paid others to relieve them part of their 
risk. By moving south-east of their endowment, F has reduced their expected 
consumption; but, in approaching the 45 degree line, F has increased the security of 
their consumption. F in this situation is a ‘hedger’. At the same time, G, by shifting 
their consumption ‘south-east’ of their endowment; increases their expected 
E
C
1CF1 
1CG1 
0CG1 
0CF1 
efficiency 
locus 
45 degrees 
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consumption, but, by withdrawing further from their 45 degree line, reduces the 
security of their consumption. Group G are speculators. 
 
In the general equilibrium, one group will be Hedgers and the other Speculators: one 
group will be increasing their expected income at the cost to its security, and the other 
will be reducing their expected income, but to the benefit of their security. Hedgers 
pay Speculators to assume part of their risk.  
 
The social function of real debt is established. Real debt allows the relatively risk 
insulated to supply ‘insurance’ to the relatively risk exposed over unpredictable 
fluctuations in factor prices caused by technologisation.  
 
A ‘three state’ exposition with an Edgeworth ‘Cube’. 
Before advancing to money bonds, it is advisable to deal with a query: Is the analysis 
of the previous section simply a ‘wonder’ of its two state assumption? We do not 
think so. Diagrammatically it can be extended to the three state case.  
 
Suppose there are as before two interests, F and G, but there are now three states of 
the world; 0, 1 and 2. State 0 is ‘low profit, low output’; State 1 is ‘high profit, high 
output’; and State 2 is ‘very high profit, very high output’. As before,  F owns a large 
amount of capital relative  to G, so its endowment rises relative to G in States 1 and 2. 
 
The social, and their distribution, can be represented in an Edgeworth ‘Cube’. 
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Figure 7: Endowments in a three state world. 
 
The welfare efficient locus of consumption can be represented by a diagonal 
extending from the hindmost ‘South West’ corner to the foremost ‘North East’ corner. 
Evidently, the Endowment point, E, will (flukes aside) not lie on that diagonal, and 
not be welfare efficient.  
 
An efficient consumption point can, nevertheless, be reached by means of F’s sale of 
capital to G, and purchase of bonds from G. The magnitude of the real rate of interest 
on these bonds can be chosen so that it is lower than the rate of profit in state 1 and 2, 
but higher than the profit rate in state 0. Given this, every such capital-for bonds swap 
reduces F’s consumption in states 1 and 2, but increases it in state 0. As can be seen 
E
the efficient locus 
the endowment point
0CF1 
1CF1 
2CF1 
 17
from Figure 9, this drives the actual consumption point from E and towards the 
diagonal. A sufficiently large capital-for bonds swap will drive the consumption point 
to the diagonal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Efficient consumption in a three state world. 
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Monetary debt as an antidote to monetary risk  
 
What is the significance of the social functionality of real bonds for the social 
functionality of money bonds?  None of the face it.4 But it is suggestive of a 
hypothesis: if real bonds are useful in managing technology shocks (= shocks that 
affect the profit rate), might money bonds be useful in managing money shocks (= 
shocks that affect the price-level)? 
 
The paper contends this is so. To argue this we now introduce unpredictability in the 
price-level. 
 
Monetary risk but no technology risk  
 
To demonstrate the implications of price-level risk we first turn to a peculiar, but 
analytically useful, possibility: where the future path of the profit rate is known but, 
the price level is risky on account of money supply shocks.  
 
The optimisation conditions will now be, 
 
                                                 
4 Under an assumption of perfect price predictability, the synchronisation of 
consumption secured by real bonds could instead be achieved by money bonds; as 
money bonds ‘repeat’ the relation between current and future marginal utility that real 
bonds secure. But the key point is that money bonds not required for the 
synchronisation consumption. Thus, under environment of perfect price level 
predictability, money bonds remain a 5th wheel. 
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   1[1 ]Uc EUcρ= +   capital    
1[1 ]Uc r EUc= +   real bonds   
1
1[ ]
1
iUc E Uc π
+= +   money bonds   
 
Evidently, it is the condition for real bonds that is now redundant, and that simply 
‘repeats’ the equimargial condition for capital.  Real bonds simply replicate capital 
market under the present assumptions; real bonds cannot do anything that capital does 
not do.  
 
By contrast, the money bonds equimarginal condition does not merely ‘repeat’ the 
equimarginal condition for capital. And that, we will argue, that money bonds secure 
the socially efficient sharing of consumption in the face of risk in the money supply. 
 
To introduce this contention, it will be useful to first  consider how unpredictability in 
the money supply may impart unpredictability to the consumption of individuals. This 
possibility can be traced to the ‘real balance effects’, which redistribute consumption 
from one individual to another whenever there is a differential in the growth rates of 
the nominal endowments of different persons.5  
                                                 
5 The real balance effect (or the windfall in purchasing power) = 
j j
jdM M dP dh
P P P
− −  
 
Assuming no change in real demand for money, the real balance effect of a permanent 
increase in money is 
jdM M dP
P P P
− = [ ] [ ] [ ]
j j j j j
j
j j
M dM dP M dM dM M
P M P P M M P
μ μ− = − = −  
 
Conclusion: it is a differential between the growth in j’s money endowment and the 
aggregate money growth that creates a real balance effect for j. But as 
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     0j kμ μ− ≠      
 
Any person who experiences a growth rate in their nominal endowments in excess of 
the growth rate of some other person will experience an increase in purchasing power 
relative to that other person. There will be a redistribution of consumption to the 
person with the larger rate of growth, and from the person with a smaller rate of 
growth.  
 
But redistribution by way of real balance effects does not itself cause unpredictability 
in the consumption. If the differential does not vary with the ‘state of the world’, 
 
   s j s kμ μ ψ− =   for all states of the world s  
 
; that is, if it is perfectly predictable; then the redistribution is the same in all ‘states of 
the world’, and no unpredictability has been imparted to the consumption of any 
individual.  
 
It is if the differential varies from state to state,  
 
    s j s kμ μ ψ− ≠  for all s    
                                                                                                                                            
j j k ks sμ μ μ+ =      or [1 ]k j k ks sμ μ μ− + =  or [ ]j k j ksμ μ μ μ− = −  
we could equally say that in a two person economy, the real balance effect of a 
permanent increase in money = [ ]
j
k j kM s
P
μ μ− , and it is a differential between the 
growth in j’s money endowment and the growth in k’s money endowment that creates 
a real balance effect for j. 
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that then the size of the redistribution varies, from state to state, and an 
unpredictability will been imparted to consumption. 
 
The welfare significance of the creation of unpredictability in consumption by 
unpredictability in money can be better appreciated by registering once more our 
earlier conclusion that welfare efficiency requires the consumption of all individuals 
to be ‘synchronised’ with aggregate consumption. That is, under identical and 
homothetic preferences, the consumption of all individuals should rise and fall in 
proportion to aggregate consumption. In other words each individual’s consumption 
should have exactly the same riskiness as aggregate consumption. But when 
technology is perfectly predictable (as we are presently assuming) then there are no 
shocks to aggregate consumption, and so no unpredictibility (or riskiness) in 
aggregate consumption. Therefore, efficiency requires there be no unpredictibility (or 
riskiness) in the consumption of any individual. The variance of each individual’s 
consumption should be zero. But a less than perfectly predictable differential in 
money endowment growth rates, will (it would seem) impart some unpredictability to 
consumption, and thereby violate welfare efficiency. 
 
An Edgeworth Box illustration 
 
The notion that an imperfectly predictable differential in money endowment growth 
rates poses a threat to welfare efficiency can be illustrated by a simple case that can be 
represented on an Edgeworth Box. The same Box can demonstrate that money bonds 
will remedy this problem. 
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Again, let the economy consists of two persons – F and G. Let there be two possible 
money supply states, 0 and 1. In state zero there is no change in the money supply. In 
state 1 there is a shock increase in the money supply. Thus 1 01 1π π> . Technology, 
however, is completely invariant, with the consequence that the total consumption 
endowments are the same in states 0 and 1, and the Box is a ‘square’. The action takes 
place in the change in the distribution of endowments within the square. 
 
Suppose, as the baseline case, that F and G’s nominal endowment grow at the same 
rate in state 1.  
 23
 
State  
of the 
world 
aggregate 
money 
growth 
Fμ  Gμ  F Gμ μ−  
0 0 0 0 0 
1 μ  μ  μ  0 
 
Table 1 F and G’ nominal endowments growing at same rate 
 
In this case the differential is zero in both states. There is no redistribution of 
purchasing power in state 1. In terms of the Edgeworth Box the purchasing power of 
F and G lies on the diagonal, which under our present assumptions is identical to the 
45 degree line. 
 
But suppose now that all of the increase in money in state of the world 1 is received 
by F. 
 
 
 
State of the 
world 
μ Fμ  Gμ  F Gμ μ−  
0 0 0 0 0 
1 μ  
F
M
M
μ  0 FMMμ  
 
Table 2: F’s nominal endowment growing faster than Gs in state 1 
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In state 1 there is a redistribution of purchasing power from F to G. Thus, in terms of 
the Box, the endowment point E is pushed off the 45 degree line, and to E’. 
 
 
Figure 9: Unpredictibility in the differential in growth in money endowments creates 
unpredictability in consumption 
 
At E’ the expected utility indifference curves intersect, and this would seem to spell a 
welfare inefficiency.  
 
However, the existence of money bonds will secure efficiency. 
 
The critical observation to sustain this contention is that F can shift their consumption 
point from their endowment point, E’, by (in period 0) selling capital in order to buy 
money bonds. Assuming ρ+ 1π > i > ρ +  0π (so that neither bonds nor capital 
E’ 
0CF 
1CF 
efficiency 
locus 
45degrees 
E 
1CG 
0CG 
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dominate each other), a purchase of money bonds by F, financed by the sale of F’s 
capital, will reduce F’s consumption by in state of the world 1 (when real interest 
rates are lower than the profit rate), and increase F’s consumption in state zero (when 
real interest rates are higher than the profit rate). More precisely F’ consumption falls 
by ρ+1π− i in state of the world 1, and rises by i-[ρ+  0π] in state zero. F’s purchase of 
bonds (from G), financed by the sale of capital (to G) sends F’s consumption point 
south east. Greater purchases will send F’s consumption further ‘south-east’ along a 
line with a slope in absolute terms of [ρ+1π− i ]/[ i-[ρ+  0π] ]. 
 
Conversely, F’s purchase of capital, financed by the sale of bonds, will shift the 
consumption point north west.  
 
This frontier for F also constitutes a frontier for G, who will have their own 
optimising sale and purchases of bonds and capital. 
 
The market equilibrium occurs where G and F’s iso-utility curves are tangential. This 
occurs when the consumption point is on the 45 degree line.6 In this equilibrium F 
sells capital to G, and buys bonds from G. G borrows from F to buy some of F’s 
capital. 
                                                 
6 Equilibrium requires the slope of the frontier [ρ+1π− i ]/[ i-[ρ+ 0π] ] equal that 
common slope of the ‘expected utility indifference curves’. At the 45 degree line the 
slope of the ‘expected utility indifference curves’ slope 
1
p
p− , [1-p][ρ+
1π] +p[ρ + 0π] 
= i = the expectation of the nominal rate on capital. This makes sense; there is zero 
risk premium on capital due to riskless technology. 
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Figure 10: Trading bonds and capital to an efficient point 
 
The critical point is that at the equilibrium consumption point, C, both F and G have 
zero variance in their consumption. The consumption of each in both states of the 
world is the same. F’s consumption is no higher in state 1 than state 0. The very 
increase in the money supply that F receives in state 1 creates an inflation that reduces 
the real value of the bonds F has purchased. Thus a non-neutrality favourable to F 
(receiving the money shock) has been cancelled by a non-neutrality unfavourable to F 
(the erosion in the real value of the money principal F is owed by G). Similarly, G’s 
consumption is no lower in state 1 than state 0. The very increase in the money supply 
that F receives in state 1 creates in state 1 an inflation that reduces the real debt G 
owes to F. A unfavourable non-neutrality (the ‘inflation tax’ of the money shock) has 
E’ 
0CF 
1CF 
efficiency 
locus 
45degrees 
C 
0CG 
1CG 
 27
been cancelled by an favourable non-neutrality (the erosion in the real value of the 
money principal they owed.) 
 
Notice that the equilibrium does not eliminate F’s ‘good fortune’ in receiving a 
disproportionate amount of the monetary shock of state 1: F’s expected utility is still 
greater than it would be in the absence of the monetary shock in state 1. Indeed F’s 
consumption outcome in both states of the world is higher than it would be in the 
absence of the monetary shock. F’s benefit is spread out across states. 
Correspondingly, G’s consumption outcome is lower in both states of the world than 
it would be in the absence of the monetary shock. G’s loss is spread out across states. 
So relative to no shock, F benefits in both states, and G loses. (But relative to the 
shock, F’s is down in state 1 and G is up, while F is up in state 0 and G is down). 
 
S states and J persons: a successful extension  
But we have over stepped ourselves. The following considerations establish that the 
existence of money bonds does not necessarily ensure that consumption of each 
individual is state invariant. Recall that we have previously dealt with the two state of 
the world situation. In Table 2, F’s indebtedness to G solves the potential inefficiency, 
by transferring to state of the world 0 part of F’s good fortune in state of the world 1 , 
and transferring part of Gs ill fortune from state of the world 1 to state of the world 0. 
The ups and downs in F and G are straightened out. 
 
But now suppose that there are three states of the world. In two of these there is a 
money shock. In one of these two F gets the whole of the money shock, but in the 
second G gets the whole of it.  
 28
 
 
state aggregate 
money 
growth 
Fμ  Gμ  F Gμ μ−  
0 0 0 0 0 
1 μ  
F
M
M
μ  0 FMMμ  
2 μ  0 
G
M
M
μ  - GMMμ  
 
 
Table 3: F’s nominal endowment grows faster than G’s in one state, and G’s grows 
faster than F’s in the other  
 
Is there a level of money debt that can ‘straighten out’ the consumption profiles, so 
that consumption is invariant to the state? No. There is no magnitude of money debt 
between F and G that can do that. If F was to lend to G, then F’s ill fortune in state 2 
is made even worse by the fact that their loan has been eroded in real value, and Gs 
good fortune is made even better. Thus we do not get zero variance in both person’s 
consumption. Conversely, if G was to lend to F then G’s ill fortune in state 1 is made 
even worse by the fact of their loan, and Fs good fortune is made even better. We do 
not get zero variance. 
 
Do we therefore conclude that money debt cannot immunise an economy against 
money risk in an S state economy? No. There exists a monetary risk environment 
which is ‘amenable’ to money debt functioning to secure efficiency. Under this 
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plausible modelling monetary risk environment money debt can function in S states as 
2. 
 
We can introduce the ‘amenable risk environment’ by considering that money loans 
worked in the two state world because there was a perfectly coincidence between F’s 
‘fortunate state’ and the high inflation state (and, correspondingly, a perfect 
coincidence between G’s ‘unfortunate state’ and the high inflation state). However, in 
the three state counter-example, there was no longer this coincidence: the high 
inflation state was sometimes a fortunate state for F, and sometimes an unfortunate 
state for F. 
 
It would seem that money lending works if the direction and magnitude of 
redistribution caused by the money shock can be mapped uniquely into the inflation 
state. One modelling of money shocks that conforms to this requirement supposes that 
each person’s money growth is a linear function of growth in aggregate money,  
 
    s j j sμ α μ=    for all j and all s  
 
This modelling can be interpreted as supposing that the share any person receives of 
the aggregate money shock is invariant to the size of the aggregate money shock.7 To 
double the aggregate shock is to double the size of each individual’s shock.  This 
formulation does not require that all receive the same share, or a share proportionate 
to one’s initial holdings: there is no requirement that the distribution be “unbiased”. It 
                                                 
7 The modelling implies 
j j
jM M
M M
αΔ =Δ . 
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could be grossly biased: a given person’s share of the total could be could be 90 
percent, or one billionth of a percent. The only restriction on bias is that the bias be 
‘neutral to the scale’; so that if you receive 90 percent of the shock in one state, you 
receive 90 percent of the shock in all states.   
 
The assumption implies the differential between F’s and G’s money growth is 
uniquely relatable to money growth. 
 
 
    [ ]s F s G F G sμ μ α α μ− = −  
 
It can be shown that under this assumed modelling, and in spite of any variation 
across states of the world of the differential in the growth of money endowments, 
there exists a degree of monetary indebtedness between F and G such that the 
difference between the growth in monetary endowments of F and G, after allowing for 
debt flows, is the same in all states. It is proved in an Appendix that, assuming there is 
only F and G, this degree of indebtedness is, 
 
   1 1
F G
F
F G
D
M M
α α−=
+
      
 
   FD =  F’s ownership of money bonds 
 
This quantity of debt will make for a uniform excess differential between state of the 
world 1 and state of the world s. The actual differential of F over G can be calculated 
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to be [ ][ ]F G iα α ρ− − . Assuming that there is some expectation of inflation, then F 
will have a positive differential in each state if F’s growth in money endowment 
varies more strongly than G’s with the total money growth .  
 
Notice the implication that the person who has the disproportionate share of the 
money shock will lend (ie positive D). They wish to spread out their gain, and they do 
so by lending. When inflation is high (when they receive the money shock) they are 
burnt by inflation; but when inflation is low (when they don’t receive the money 
shock) they benefit. Those who are likely to get a disproportionate (ie above average) 
share of ‘inflation’ even out the benefit by lending. On the other side, those who will 
get a below average share of inflation, even out the pain by borrowing. They protect 
themselves against the possibility of inflation by getting into debt. When inflation 
comes and they get burnt, they are rewarded by being debtors. 
 
The uniformity in the differential across states can be generalised to n persons. If we 
assume all persons have the same initial endowment 
_
M , the debt for F is 
 
 _
...1 G H IF
F
D n
n nM
α α αα + + +−= − -average share of othersFα≈     
 
The Algebraic Analysis   
Given that we have advanced beyond two states, the diagrammatic analysis of the 
welfare functionality of money bonds needs to be reinforced by a mathematical 
analysis. 
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The equimarginal conditions are 
 
  1[1 ]
j j
C CU EUρ= +     capital   
  1 1
1[1 ] [ [ ] cov( , )]
1
j j j
C CU i EU E π υπ= + + −+   money bonds  
   
  where    
    1
1
j
j C
j
C
U
EU
υ ≡       
Thus,8    
    1 1[ ] cov( , )
1 1
jE
i
ρ υ ππ
+− = − −+ +    
 
Thus, 
 
    cov( , ) cov( , )j kυ π υ π− = −  for all k 
This equality establishes a relation between the normalised marginal utilities, 
    ευυ =− ksjs   all j and k,  
    ε  =  disturbance uncorrelated with -π 
If ε = 0 then  
 
                                                 
8  1 1
1[1 ] [1 ] [ [ ] cov( , )]
1C C
EU i EU Eρ π υπ+ = + + −+   
 11 [1 ] [ ] [1 ]cov( , )
1
i E iρ π υπ+ = + + + −+  
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     ksjs υυ =  
that  implies
F G
F G
C C
EC EC
=
, which is equivalent to the earlier stated condition of welfare 
efficiency. 9 This  is the situation of the ‘amenable risk environment’ analysed  in the preceding 
section. 
 
If ε ≠  0 then  
 
     ksjs υυ ≠  
that implies
F G
F G
C C
EC EC
≠ , which is a violation of the earlier stated condition of welfare 
efficiency. This is the situation where each agent’s money shock cannot be perfectly 
predicted by the size of the aggregate money shock; this is the situation outside the 
‘amenable risk environment’.  
 
This is not to say there is no risk immunisation at all by money bonds outside of that 
amenable environment. Recall Table 3. We have argued that in this context perfect 
                                                 
9 Proof: 
   
1
1
[ ]
[ ]
s F
s F
s s F
C
p C
α
αυ
−
−= ∑  
 
If 
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
F G
F G
C C C
C C C
= =  then 
F G
F G
C C
EC EC
=
. But if  
F G
F G
C C
EC EC
=
 then 
 
  
1
1
[ ]
[ ]
F
s G
G
s F s G
F
s s G
G
ECC
EC
ECp C
EC
α
α
υ υ
−
−
= =
∑
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immunisation is not possible. Is therefore, none? What is the probability of states 0, 1 
and 2 were 0.5, 0.49 and 0.01 respectively. Would not F lending to G cause some 
improving dimunition in the variance of consumption? 
 
Money bonds retain a function outside the ‘amenable risk environment’. They remove 
the inefficiencies in consumption allocation that, in their absence, are systematically 
or predictably related to the size of the aggregate money shock. They leave only 
(‘only’) inefficiencies in consumption allocation that are not predictably related to the 
size of the aggregate money shock 
 
Technological and monetary risk concurrently 
 
Thus far we have concentrated on the case where there is monetary risk, but no 
technological risk. What happens when there is simultaneously monetary risk and 
technological risk?  
 
Suppose the money shocks are perfectly correlated with technology shocks, and there 
is a two person, two state world. So there is a high output and high money state, and a 
low output and low money state. This situation can be represented in a Box diagram, 
and its inspection reveals there is no difficulty in reaching efficiency.10  
 
But what if we don’t make those assumptions? 
 
                                                 
10 The cov( , )jπ υ− are the same for F and G, but now non-zero, since the υ now vary 
across states. 
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Both Technology Shocks and Monetary Shocks Present 
 
There are now three optimising conditions, 
   
  1[[1 ] ]
j jUc E Ucρ= +    capital 
  1[1 ]
j jUc r EUc= +    real bonds 
  1[1 ] [ ]
1
j
j UcUc i E π= + +    money bonds 
 
The condition for capital and real bonds secure an efficiency in consumption in 
allocation in the face of technological shocks 
 
The condition for capital and money bonds secure a welfare efficient distribution in 
consumption in the face of monetary shocks, at least in the face of an appropriate risk 
environment. 
 
    1 1[ ] cov( , )
1 1
jE
i
ρ υ ππ
+− = − −+ +    
 
Thus, 
 
    cov( , ) cov( , )j kυ π υ π− = −  for all k 
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So, just as in the previous section under a certain environment of monetary risk, 
welfare efficiency will be secured. Certainly, welfare inefficiencies will not be 
predictable on the size of the aggregate money shock.11  
 
                                                 
11 In order to eliminate any welfare inefficiency caused by money shocks any 
redistribution from the monetary side must be state-invariant, i.e. perfectly 
predictable. The real balance effect for F: 
 
 
F F
F
dM M dP dh
P P P
− − = [ ]F F F
F F
M dM dhdP
P M P h
− −  
 
Assuming the monetary shock is permanent this can be rewritten, 
[ [ ] ]F F F
F F
M dM dhdM dh
P M M h h
= − − − = . .[ ]F F FM h hP μ μ− − −  
But the immunisation against real shocks by real bonds side will ensure 
. .
0Fh h− = , as 
everybody’s real consumption grows by the same rate in all states. So, the real 
balance effect for F: 
 
 
= [ ]F F
M
P
μ μ−  
 
So we want the cross-person differentials in the growth in nominal endowments to be 
the same in all states. Let s index monetary shocks, and prime index technology 
shocks, then state-invariant differential in the growth in nominal endowments 
between F and G requires the satisfaction of,   
 
1
1[ ][ ] [ ][ ]
s
s
F G F GM D DM
α α π πΔ − Δ− = − −   all s 
 
1
' 1'[ ][ ] [ ][ ]
s
s
F G F GM D DM
α α π πΔ − Δ− = − −  
 
1
" 1"[ ][ ] [ ][ ]
s
s
F G F GM D DM
α α π πΔ − Δ− = − −  
etc 
 
But we know (see Appendix) that DF and DG can be chosen to satisfy one of these. 
But to satisfy one is to satisfy all since 1[ ]sπ π− = ' 1'[ ]s π π− = " 1"[ ]s π π− etc 
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Thus we have a dual functionality: real bonds cope with real (technological shocks) 
and money bonds cope with monetary shocks. There is no suggestion, therefore, that 
money bonds ‘dominate’ real bonds. Yes money bonds can do something that real 
bonds cannot do. But, conversely, real bonds can do something money bonds cannot 
do. 
 
Some Remarks 
How real is the ‘amenable monetary risk environment’ ? 
 
It has been argued that there is a certain environment of monetary risk that can be 
immunised against by money bonds. This environment of monetary risk is that where 
aggregate money growth is unpredictable but each person’s money growth is a linear 
function of aggregate money growth. Equivalently, where the differential in the 
growth rate of nominal endowments of different persons is perfectly correlated with 
aggregate money growth. 
 
Is this kind of risk environment a freak occurrence? Are differentials completely 
uncorrelated with the aggregate growth in the money supply? Or can this kind of risk 
environment be given are plausible rationalisation? There are several scenarios for 
rationalising a correlation between the growth in aggregate money and differentials in 
the growth in the nominal endowments of persons. 
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Spending vs Revenue biases in the disposal of seignoirage 
 
Siegnoirage may be entirely devoted to cutting taxes; or entirely devoted to increasing 
transfers; or it may be devoted some more neutral combination off the two. Suppose 
that seigniorage is not disposed of neutrally between those whose contribution to 
government revenue is a net positive, and those whose contribution to government 
revenue is a net negative. Suppose it is instead entirely devoted to increasing transfers 
such that net negative contributions is still more negative. Under this scenario, we 
have a situation where each person’s money growth is a linear function of aggregate 
money growth. The coefficient on this linear function is zero for those who make a 
net positive contribution to government revenue. The coefficient on this linear 
function is positive for those who make a net negative contribution to government 
revenue. Under this schema, the theory implies that those who make a net negative 
contribution to government revenue will borrow in money terms from those who 
make a net positive contribution. 
 
 
Bond holders and tax payers 
 
Increases in the money supply commonly involve purchases of government debt by 
central banks from private holders of government debt. It can be argued here that 
these purchases amount to a gift of money to tax payers, (and not bond owners).  
 
One may argue that Central Bank purchases of government debt are equivalent to 
money grants to tax payers from a scrutiny of simply granting money to tax payers. 
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Suppose individuals are divided into two groups: owners of (inflation indexed) 
government debt, and tax payers. Suppose also, for the sake of argument, that 
government debt owners pay no tax, and tax payers own no government debt. And 
suppose in this situation that the government unpredictably prints money, and simply 
gives it to tax payers. In this story, high money growth states redistribute consumption 
away from bond holders and towards tax payers. The price level, and the nominal 
demand for money, will rise in accordance with the growth rate of aggregate money 
endowment, but as the money endowment of tax payers has grown at a greater rate 
than this, tax payers have excess money balances that they partly spend on bonds. 
Bond holders, by contrast, have received no increase in their money endowment, and 
in the face of rising prices and their rising money demand, sell some of their bonds to 
tax payers. In this story tax payers will hedge their upside by lending money to 
government bond holders. 
 
The key question is: how can the purchase of government debt by the central bank be 
any different from a grant of money of to tax payers? In the case of the grant, money 
is given to tax payers who buy bonds, and thereby obtain relief against taxes. In the 
case of the purchase, the money is granted to the central bank who buys government 
bonds, and thereby also obtain relief for the tax payer against taxes.12 It makes no 
difference whether the new money is given to tax payers to purchase bonds, or given 
to central banks to purchase bonds on tax payers’ behalf. In either case the increase in 
                                                 
12 This case for the equivalence of an open market purchase of bonds with a gift of 
money to tax payers does assume indexed government debt. But introducing nominal 
money debt simply introduces an element of debt cancellation. The central bank’s 
purchase of nominal debt is equivalent to a transfer of money to tax payers, combined 
with a cancellation of a certain amount of the debt. This does create complications: 
debt holders will want a higher rate of interest to compensate to the probability of 
cancellation by way of inflation. 
 40
the money supply goes wholly to one group, and in the context of unpredictable 
inflation, a welfare-inefficient unpredictability consumption threatens. That is 
removed by tax payers lending in nominal terms to holders of government debt. 
 
How important quantitatively is monetary risk immunisation?   
 
Paper only presents an argument why the demand for money bonds might be non-
zero. No argument that the demand for money bonds might be ‘large’ or even 
‘significant’. No attempt to show that the demand for money bonds, thus rationalised,  
might be comparable  observed preponderance of money bonds can be explained. 
 
The welfare functionality of money bonds and the cost of inflation. 
 
The analysis of the welfare functionality has implications for the theory of the 
costliness of inflation. On the face of it, the analysis is an argument against the 
costliness of unpredictable inflation. The argument implies that money shocks, such 
that each individuals allocation is given proportion of the aggregate money shock, 
will have no welfare costs. Thus in the analysis, the randomness of aggregate shocks 
is not welfare costly. Neither is the biasedness in the distribution of the shock. It is the 
randomness of the bias of the distribution that money bonds cannot immunise against 
and is welfare costly. 
 
The welfare functionality of monetary equilibrium. 
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In advanced a social functionality to money bonds, it has also advanced a social 
functionality to monetary equilibrium, and the instability that it implies. In models 
without monetary risk, it is not clear what social function is served by ‘monetary 
equilibrium’; that is, by an equality between the demand for money and its supply. On 
the contrary, it would seem advantageous to make the real money supply as large as 
possible this period, presumably by keeping P way below the equilibrium P, and 
creating an excess supply of money. By contrast, the present analysis confers a the 
welfare functionality on the existence of monetary equilibrium. It is, to illustrate, a 
good thing if P increases on response to an increase in current M. Because it is the 
increase in P, combined with money bonds, that will stop the money increase from 
causing welfare inefficient disturbances to the allocation in consumption. 
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Appendix 1 
This appendix demonstrates that if 
s j s
j
jM M
αΔ Δ=  then the equality of the differentials 
corresponds with certain distribution of money debt. 
 
The equality of the differential in the nominal endowments of F and G, in state s and 
state 1, may be stated as, 
 
 
1 1 1 1[ [ ]] [ [ [ ]]
[ [ ]] [ [ [ ]]]
F F G G
F G
s F F s s G G s
F G
D i D i
M M
D i D i
M M
π ρ π ρ
π ρ π ρ
Δ + − + Δ + − +−
Δ + − + Δ + − += −
 
 
where DF = the amount of bonds owned by F. 
 
Thus, 
 
 
 
1 11 1 [ ] [ ]s ss sG G G GF F F F
F G F G
D DD D
M M M M
π ππ πΔ − Δ −Δ − Δ −− = −  
 
 
11
1[ ] [ ][ ]
ss
sG G GF F F
F G F G F G
DD
M M M M M M
π πΔ ΔΔ Δ− − − = − −  
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But assuming  
 
 
s j s
j
jM M
αΔ Δ=  
 
then equality across states requires  
 
1
1[ ][ ] [ ][ ]
s
sGF
F G F G
DD
M M M M
α α π πΔ Δ− − = − −  
 
1 1[ ][ ] [ ][ ]s sGFF G F G
DD
M M
α α μ μ π π− − = − −  
 
This by the Quantity Theory reduces to 
 
GF
F GF G
DD
M M
α α− = −   13 
 
This pattern of debt will make the differential in the growth in nominal endowments 
invariant across states. 
 
This expression of the indebtedness between a pair that secures an invariant 
differential in the growth in nominal endowments across states allows us to obtain the 
expression when there are three persons; 
                                                 
13 We have used an approximation which ignores cross products. The exact 
formulation would be, 
 
1 [ ]
1F G F G
iD D Mα αρ
+− = − −+  
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0F G HD D D+ + =   Market Equilibrium 
GF
F G
F G
DD
M M
α α− = −   F and G synchronised (see above) 
F H
F H
F H
D D
M M
α α− = −   F and H synchronised 
 
This is an expression in three equations and three unknowns: DF, DG, DH. 
 
Appendix 2. The supply and demand of money bonds. 
 
The capability of money bond markets to immunise the economy against monetary 
shocks would be more probingly analysed by a supply and demand of money bonds 
apparatus that, unlike Box analysis, is not restricted to two states.  
 
Supply and demand schedules can be derived from two optimisation conditions.  
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  1[1 ]C CU EUρ= +     capital   
  1 1
1[1 ] [ [ ] cov( , )]
1C C
U i EU E π υπ= + + −+   money bonds  
   
  where    
    1
1
j
j C
j
C
U
EU
υ ≡       
Thus,14   
    1 1[ ] cov( , )
1 1
jE
i
ρ υ ππ
+− = − −+ +    
 
But as 
    1 1[ ]
1 1
E i E
i
ρ π ρπ
+− ≈ − −+ +     
we may write 
    cov( , )ji Eπ ρ υ π− − ≈ − −     
 
The LHS of the equality, i E rπ− − , is the expected excess real rate of return a money 
bond over riskless capital. Thus if we take this excess to be positive - if we assume the 
real rate of return on a money bond will on average be greater than the rate of return 
                                                 
14   1 1
1[1 ] [1 ] [ [ ] cov( , )]
1C C
EU i EU Eρ π υπ+ = + + −+  
  11 [1 ] [ ] [1 ]cov( , )
1
i E iρ π υπ+ = + + + −+  
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on capital owing to the riskiness of the real return on money bonds – then the RHS of 
the equality (that is, negative of the covariance of normalised marginal utility with the 
growth rate of purchasing power negative cov( , )jυ π− ) can be identified as ‘the 
inflation risk premium’.  
 
   cov( , )j jω υ π−Π ≡ − −  
Thus, 
 
    cov( , )j ji Eπ ρ υ π ω−Π− − ≈ − − ≡    
 
Equivalently, 
    [ ] ji Eρ π ω−Π− − ≈ −      
 
In terms of F and G,  
 
 [ ]
Fi Eρ π ω− Π− − ≈ −       
 [ ]
Gi Eρ π ω− Π− − ≈ −       
The LHS may be considered as the ‘price’ of money bonds; it is their expected 
opportunity cost. The RHS is a magnitude that will change with the amount of money  
bonds owned, or owed. Thus for F and G we can trace out a relation between the 
‘price of bonds’ and the quantity of bonds demanded, or supplied.  
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At D = 0 (ie zero money bonds) the magnitudes of Fω−Π−  and Gω−Π−  are determined by 
the co-movement of each groups consumption endowment with the negative inflation 
rate; the rate of growth of purchasing power. The party with the greater growth of 
nominal endowment during high inflation, F, will have  
 a positive co-movement in consumption and inflation ,  
 a positive co–movement in marginal utility and the growth of purchasing 
 power, 
 a negative ω−Π  ( cov( , )jυ π≡ − − ),  
 and so a positive -ω−Π   
 
We can treat - Fπω− as the vertical axis plotting of F’ demand for bonds in a figure that 
plots [ ]i Eρ π− − on the vertical axis, and money bond issues on the horizontal axis. 
As F’s ownership of bonds becomes positive (D > 0), the magnitude of - Fπω−  falls, by 
the logic explained earlier: the bond holder, as ‘hedger’, is reducing the comovement 
of their consumption opportunity with the deflation rate. A ‘downward’ sloping 
demand curve is traced out for bonds. 
 
We can also trace out a supply curve for bonds. The party with the lesser growth of 
nominal endowment during high inflation, G, will have,  
 a negative co-movement in consumption and inflation ,  
 a negative co–movement in marginal utility and the growth of purchasing 
 power, 
 a positive ω−Π  ( cov( , )jυ π≡ − − ),  
 and so a negative -ω−Π   
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We can treat - Gω−Π as the vertical axis plotting of G’s supply of bonds in a figure that 
lots [ ]i Eρ π− − on the vertical axis, and money bond issues on the horizontal axis. As 
G’s money debt (liability in money bonds) becomes positive, the magnitude of - Gω−Π  
rises, by the logic explained earlier Box analysis. The money debt owed by G makes a 
high inflation state less of a bad state for G; the correlation between growth in 
purchasing power gets smaller in absolute terms. - Gω−Π  gets less negative. An 
‘upward’ sloping supply curve for bonds is traced out. 
 
Because total consumption is invariant to the inflation state –and so F only gains at 
the expense of G -  the supply and demand schedules are symmetric.15 
                                                 
15 In the two state case 
 
cov( , ) cov( , )
F G
F G
C C
EC EC
π π=  
 
cov( , ) [[ ][ ] [1 ][[ ][0 ]
F
F F F F
F
C Mp C EC E p C EC E
EC P
π μ π π π= + − − + − − −  
 
 
cov( , ) [ ][ [1 ]0] [ ]
F
F F F F
F
C MC EC p p E C EC p
EC P
π π π μ= − + − − − +  
 
cov( , )
F
F
C Mp
EC P
π μ=   Similarly cov( , )
G
G
C Mp
EC P
π μ= −  
 
 49
 
Money bond market equilibrium 
 
At the intersection, the  
    Fπω−  = Gπω− =0      
r-[i-Eπ] 
D 
F
πω−−  
G
πω−−  
0
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